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THE POLITICS OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
IN INDIA AND CHINA: IT PAYS TO
INVEST IN WOMEN AND CHILDREN
Devin K. Joshi'

ABSTRACT
This article explores the attainments of China and India on measures of
basic human development as ingredients of a long-term economic development strategy. It proposes that major differences in ideology and state capacity explain in part why India has fallen behind China. The analysis
suggests that these relatively hidden politicalfactors play an important role
in transformingand advancing human development not only within India
and China but also in other developing and emerging economies. The
findings also support the notion that public investments in the capabilities
of women and children have significant social and economic payoffs in
both the short-term and in the long-run.
Keywords: China, Children, Democracy, Human Development, Ideology, India, Politics, State Capacity, Women.
N recent years, the India-China comparison has drawn attention from

the mass media and academic scholarship as both countries have experienced tremendous economic and population growth over the last
two decades (Joshi 2011a). Together, China and India accounted for 37.5
percent of the world's population and 12.1 percent of the world's combined gross domestic product in 2010 (World Bank 2012). Between 1990
and 2010, based on exchange rate comparisons (using constant 2000 U.S.
dollars), China's gross national income increased almost eight-fold from
$446 billion to $3.26 trillion while India's economy grew more than threefold from $267 billion to $955 billion (ibid). Both states are armed with
nuclear weapons and have been rapidly climbing up the technological
1. Devin Joshi is an Assistant Professor in the Josef Korbel School of International
Studies at the University of Denver. He researches and teaches about the international and comparative politics of development with a focus on Asia. His work
concentrates on understanding how to build effective governments and inclusive
democracies with special attention to the impact of governance on human development and the Millennium Development Goals. Professor Joshi is the recipient of
multiple competitive research fellowships and has served as a visiting scholar in
China, Germany, India, South Korea, and Sweden. His regional focus has been
primarily in East Asia and South Asia although his interests are global. Prior to
joining the University of Denver, he taught at the University of Washington, University of Hawai'i and Ewha Womans University. He holds a B.A. degree from
Stanford and a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Washington.
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ladder. In 1996, China and India were ranked 28th and 31st in the world
in the number of U.S. patents registered (USPTO 2010). By 2011, they
were respectively ranked 9th and 16th (USPTO 2012). With their newly
created wealth and uniquely large populations, India and China have improved their positions in international negotiations and diplomacy
through the formation of blocs in cooperation with Brazil and Russia
(BRIC) and together with Brazil and South Africa (BASIC). As their
young populations enter the labor force and foreign investment increases,
many expect China and India to sustain moderate to rapid economic
growth over the coming decades and reap a "demographic dividend" as
the younger population (labor force) outnumbers the elderly (dependents), especially in India (Mahtaney 2007; Wilson and Purushothama
2003). If these trends continue, India and China are slated to become
major world powers by the middle of the twenty-first century (Drezner
2007; Mahtaney 2007).
While China and India are often seen as rising in tandem, a common
perception still holds that on many economic performance measures,
China has surpassed India and is likely to stay ahead of India for quite
some time (Bardhan 2010; Dobson 2009; Engardio 2007; Winters and
Yusuf 2007; Smith 2008). As Table 1 illustrates, according to the World
Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Index (GCI), over the past
seven years China has moved up from a rank of 49th in 2005 to become
the 26th most competitive economy in the world in 2011. By contrast,
over the same period, India declined from a rank of 50th in the world to
56th. Reflecting this trend, global attitude surveys find that almost 90
percent of Chinese express satisfaction with the direction their country is
heading compared to less than 50 percent of Indians, as displayed in Figure 1.
Table 1: Global Competitiveness Index Scores for India and China
Year

India Score (Rank)

China Score (Rank)

2011

4.30 (56)

4.90 (26)

2010

4.33 (51)

4.84 (27)

2009

4.30 (49)

4.70 (29)

2008

4.33 (50)

4.70 (30)

2007

4.33 (48)

4.57 (34)

2006

4.44 (43)

4.24 (54)

2005

4.04 (50)

4.07 (49)

Source: World Economic Forum reports, various years.
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Figure 1: Satisfaction with the Country's Direction (2002-2012)
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Data Source: Pew Global Attitudes Project 2012. Question #784: "Overall, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in our country today?"

Although there are multiple possible causes of variation in economic
performance between China and India, much attention has focused on
the countries' differing attainments on basic human development (BHD)
(Bhalla 1992; Acharya et al. 2001; Dreze and Sen 2002; Dummer and
Cook 2008; Dobson 2009; Bloom et al. 2010), a key pillar of long-term
economic growth performance (e.g., Sen 1999; Ranis et al. 2000; Suri et al.
2011). Examining BHD performance in China and India over the last
half-century, this article proposes a partial explanation for why India has
fallen behind China. Beginning with a brief discussion of "human development" as a currently influential approach to thinking about global development (Joshi 2012a; Joshi 2012b), the chapter focuses on two
relatively hidden political variables that appear to have played a major
role in the BHD divergence between China and India: ideology and state
capacity. The analysis suggests that efforts to develop greater state capacity and promote a more egalitarian ideology are key ingredients to
advance public investment in BHD, especially the capabilities of women
and children, as a strategy to deliver significant social and economic
payoffs in both the short and long-term.
I.

THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PARADIGM

Since the end of the Cold War, the human development paradigm has
become the dominant approach to international development among the
United Nations system and has been highly influential in shaping global
perceptions of what constitutes development (Jolly et al. 2004; Joshi
2012a; Th6rien 2012). The concept of human development (HD) which
stems from the Nobel-prize winning Indian economist Amartya Sen's
"capabilities approach" can be defined as "a process of enlarging people's
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choices. The most critical ones are to lead a long and healthy life, to be
educated and to enjoy a decent standard of living." (UNDP 1990: 10) As
Sen (1999: 291) argues, HD is a function of the capabilities people possess, which can be evaluated by "the extent to which people have the
opportunity to achieve outcomes that they value and have reason to
value." HD can be seen as intrinsically valuable because capabilities directly enhance people's substantive freedoms. HD is also instrumentally
valuable because enhancing people's capabilities advances economic
development.
Sen argues that, in all modern societies, certain fundamental capabilities are crucial to determining people's choices and the ability to lead
enjoyable lives. As displayed in Table 2, four of these capabilities can be
seen as more or less universal. First, physical capabilitiesthat enrich the
body enable one to be healthy and have a long life. Second, intellectual
capabilities acquired through education allow us to advance our minds
and gain knowledge, understanding, reason, and wisdom. Third, financial
capabilities, as influenced by opportunities for employment, income
levels, and savings, impact one's living standards. Fourth, the opportunity
for individuals to participate on equal terms in the life of their community
reflects important social capabilitiesfostered by respect for human rights
and a democratic, non-discriminatory social environment (Sen 1999; Joshi
2012a).
Table 2: Fundamental Capabilities in the Human
Development Approach
Capabilities

Focus

Indicators

1) Physical

Body

Health, Longevity

2) Intellectual

Mind

Knowledge, Schooling, Education

3) Financial

Living Standards

Income, Employment, Savings

4) Social

Equal Opportunity

Rights, Participation, Non-Discrimination

Source: Derived from Sen 1999.

HD is thus a broader way of thinking about development than a
shorter-term and narrower focus only on annual growth of per capita income. The latter approach has been criticized for undervaluing children,
women, human health, and the environment (Waring 1999). It has also
been criticized for not taking into consideration the distribution of wealth
and problems of social inequality and discrimination (Streeten 2003). As
Sen (1999: 291) points out, "income levels may often be inadequate
guides to such important matters as the freedom to live long, or the ability to escape avoidable morbidity, or the opportunity to have worthwhile
employment, or to live in peaceful and crime-free communities. These
non-income variables point to opportunities that a person has excellent
reasons to value and that are not strictly linked with economic
prosperity."
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As shown in Table 3, the goal of advancing HD has formed the basis of
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which guide the work of
the United Nations (Jolly et al. 2004; Joshi 2011b). In particular, the
MDGs concentrate on BHD, a term referring to the health and education
levels of children (both female and male) with attention to the fundamentals of child survival, immunizations, nutrition, literacy, numeracy, and
compulsory education. From an economic perspective, BHD is vital because it forms the base from which more comprehensive human capital
formation is made possible. Social investment in children and mothers is
at the heart of BHD, because it can have multiple dividends for society.
Sen (1999: 284), for example, has drawn much attention to the fact that "a
child who is denied the opportunity of elementary schooling is not only
deprived as a youngster, but also handicapped all through life (as a person unable to do certain basic things that rely on reading, writing and
arithmetic)."
Table 3: The UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
Dimension

Goal

2015 Targets Include:

I

Income/Food

Eradicate Extreme Poverty
and Hunger

'h the 1990 proportion of people
with hunger and incomes under
$1/day

2

Education

Achieve Universal Primary
Education

Primary school completion for all
boys and girls

3

Education/Women

Promote Gender Equality
and Empower Women

Gender parity at all levels of
education (primary, secondary,
tertiary)

4

Health

Reduce Child Mortality

1/3 the 1990 under-five mortality
rate

5

Health

Improve Maternal Health

'/4 the 1990 maternal mortality
rate

6

Health

Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria,
and Other Diseases

Halt and reverse the spread of
HIV/AIDS, malaria, other major
diseases

7

Environment

Ensure Environmental
Sustainability

Reverse loss of environmental
resources, th the 1990 level of
people without safe drinking
water and sanitation, etc.

8

Aid

Develop a Global
Partnership for Development

Develop a non-discriminatory
trading and financial system,
reduce developing countries' debt,
make ICT available, etc.

#

Source: Adapted from Joshi 2011b.

II.

WHY INDIA LAGS CHINA

Though many factors are involved, two relatively "hidden" political
factors can explain in part why India has thus far made less progress on
BHD than China. They can be described as "hidden" because they are a)
not always visible, b) difficult to measure, and c) typically excluded from
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quantitative statistical analyses. My focus here is on the underlying functioning of the state in building a human capital base and providing public
goods (Joshi 2011b). By steering resources, channeling social forces, and
guiding public thinking, politics play a key role in determining whether
BHD is prioritized, emphasized, supported, and guaranteed (Dreze and
Sen 2002). Among the political forces that matter, two of the most important (but often least observable) are ideology and state capacity.
A.

THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY

Ideology can be defined as a "comprehensive belief systems composed
of patterned ideas and claims to truth. Codified by social elites, these
beliefs are embraced by significant groups in society .

.

. [they] are not

merely justifications of economic class interests, but fairly comprehensive
programs designed to shape and direct human communities" (Steger
2008: 5). Because ideologies play a major role in what and how people
think, they are pivotal to HD. As relatively cohesive narratives limiting
and directing language and thought, they influence what development
methods and goals are believed to be possible and desirable both at the
elite and mass level.
While ideologies vary across multiple dimensions, a number of prominent studies have found that societies with a relatively inclusive and egalitarian ideology are more successful in advancing BHD (Esping-Andersen
1990; Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Wilkinson and Pickett 2011). By contrast, divided and patriarchal societies reinforced by inegalitarian ideologies have notably fewer public goods, and therefore lower attainments
overall on children's health and education (ibid). On this point, Sen
(1999: xii) has recognized the importance of collective action, stating, "[i]t
is important to give simultaneous recognition to the centrality of individual freedom and to the force of social influences on the extent and reach
of individual freedom. To counter the problems that we face, we have to
see individualfreedom as a social commitment" (emphasis added).
Regarding ideological emphasis on egalitarianism, China and India differ significantly despite having similarly sized territories, nearly identical
population numbers, and large agrarian populations. India as a multiparty democratic system with a relatively free press has more ideological
contestation than in China. Nevertheless, within India, the powerful ideological force of the caste system, supported by the dominant Hindu religious tradition, legitimates a fragmentation and stratification of the
population into groups viewed by many Indians as entitled to different
degrees of human development based on the hereditary caste into which
they are born (Weiner 1991).
Though caste-based inequality and patriarchy have long histories in
most parts of the Indian subcontinent, the relative passivity of most Indian political leaders to these cultural norms since Independence in 1947
has facilitated their perpetuation. During the first three decades (19471977) after Independence, the ruling Indian National Congress (INC)
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party paid lip service to the trio of "democracy," "secularism," and "socialism." Regarding the latter, however, it advocated neither egalitarianism nor empowering the masses through radical land reforms, major
literacy campaigns, gender equality, or extensive equalization efforts as
took place in Maoist China (Acharya et al. 2001). During this period,
India's Socialist Party and Communist Party did support more egalitarian
ideology and policies, but were marginal in influence, never gaining more
than a quarter of the votes combined in national elections outside the
state of Kerala (Hardgrave and Kochanek 2000: 236-37). The INC, a coalition of rural landowners and the educated urban middle-classes, generally condoned both the deep inequalities of India's stratified caste system
and the widespread ideology and practice of patriarchy (Guha 2007).
Rather than pursuing caste, class, or gender equalization, the INC aimed
for trickle-down growth through urban industrialization and state control
of industry (Kohli 2004). Upper caste Hindus (UCH), comprising about
one-fifth of the population, were dominant in political decision-making.
They held on average 67 percent of Indian Cabinet positions from 1950 to
1980 and a strong majority of leadership positions in government and the
private sector (Goyal 1989; Jayal 2006; Jaffrelot and Kumar 2009).
Although India's 1950 Constitution introduced electoral and bureaucratic quotas for "scheduled castes" (SC) and "scheduled tribes" (ST),
little else was done to provide greater equality of opportunity in practice
(Guha 2007). Efforts to lift up the lower castes became more prominent
after the INC was first defeated in national elections by the Janata party
(1977-1980), and the government constituted the Mandal Commission to
investigate caste inequality. Though the INC soon returned to power in
1980, it was defeated again in 1989, and the National Front government
moved to implement the Mandal recommendation of adding 27 percent
reservations in government jobs and educational institutions for "other
backward castes" (OBCs) (Jayal 2006: 180). In response, the 1990s were
"a period of intense caste-based political mobilization" (ibid: 156) as quotas for SCs, STs, and OBCs combined increased from 22.5 percent to 49.5
percent in central government jobs. Thus, it has only been, for the most
part, in the 1990s and 2000s that the issue of cross-caste equalization has
come to the fore. While this has coincided with some decrease in the
ideology of caste stratification in urban areas, it has paradoxically reinforced caste consciousness, social fragmentation, and identity politics
(ibid). As a result, India has yet to experience any major transformation
towards a more egalitarian dominant ideology.
As a result, over the last half-century, public health and education
gains in India have been modest in most states. With the notable exceptions of Kerala and, to a lesser extent, Tamil Nadu, the political parties in
power in the central and state governments have for the most part not
promoted an egalitarian ideology (Joshi 2012b). Ideas supportive of patriarchy and caste inequality continue to be prominent in attitudes towards public services for the poor, not only in public health, but also in
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public education, nutrition, and sanitation (Weiner 1991; Sinha 2006).
Evidence of this widely-held inegalitarian ideology of caste stratification
is most clear in the treatment of the Dalits (also known as "scheduled
castes"), who, along with indigenous peoples known as "scheduled
tribes," make up the bottom of the social pyramid and number between
150 and 200 million. Formerly known as "untouchables," the Dalits are
themselves divided into hundreds of sub-castes and often locked hereditarily into occupations that are dangerous, difficult, dirty, and dehumanizing. A few examples of Dalit sub-castes include the Dom, who cremate
dead bodies; the Pakhi, Bhangi, and Sikkaliar, who transport and clean
human excrement; the Musahar, who hunt rodents; and the Chamar, who
work with leather. Though conditions are typically better in urban areas,
surveys conducted in Indian villages have found discrimination against
Dalits to be widespread, even in recent years. Table 4 lists some of the
most common prohibitions, including denied access to employment, food
sharing, water facilities, health care facilities, places of worship, police
stations, restaurants, hotels, residential housing, public transportation,
and selling in markets.
As Human Rights Watch reports:
Caste-motivated killings, rapes, and other abuses are a daily occurrence in India. Between 2001 and 2002 close to 58,000 cases were
registered under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act - legislation that criminalizes particularly
egregious abuses against Dalits and tribal community members. A
2005 government report states that a crime is committed against a
Dalit every 20 minutes. Though staggering, these figures represent
only a fraction of actual incidents since many Dalits do not register
cases for fear of retaliation by the police and upper-caste individuals. . . . Exploitation of labor is at the very heart of the caste system.
Dalits are forced to perform tasks deemed too "polluting" or degrading for non-Dalits to carry out. According to unofficial estimates,
more than 1.3 million Dalits - mostly women - are employed as

manual scavengers to clear human waste from dry pit latrines. In
several cities, Dalits are lowered into manholes without protection to
clear sewage blockages, resulting in more than 100 deaths each year
from inhalation of toxic gases or from drowning in excrement.
(HRW 2007)
Compared to India, China has experienced less ideological fragmentation and less fragmentation of the population into separate and competing caste identities. Moreover, in China, the State and the ruling Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) are the dominant sources of ideological influence. Though ideology has shifted over CCP generations, it has differed
from India in the sense that it has continuously retained a certain degree
of emphasis on collectivism and egalitarianism. Most notably, in the
Maoist period from roughly 1949 to 1978, promotion of radical egalitarianism was coupled with serious efforts to raise the status of women and
ensure child survival. The CCP's Marxist-Leninist ideology heavily em-
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Table 4: Common Forms of Discrimination Against Indian Dalits
Frequency
(% of Villages)

Forms/Sites of Discrimination against Dalits

Over 50%

Denied entry into non-Dalit houses, Prohibitions against food sharing,
Denied entry into places of worship, Ill-treatment of Dalit women by
other women

45-50%

Denied access to water facilities, Ban on marriage processions, Not
allowed to sell milk to cooperatives, Denied barber services, Denied
laundry services, Ill-treatment of women by non-Dalit men

30-40%

Denied work as agricultural laborers, Cannot sell things in local
markets, Denied visits by health workers, Separate seating in
restaurants, Denied access to irrigation facilities, Separate utensils in
restaurants, Discriminatory treatment in police stations, Separate
seating in self-help groups

25-30%

Denied entry into police stations, Denied carpenter's services, Denied
entry into Public Distribution System shops, Denied access to
restaurants/hotels, Forced to stand before upper-caste men

20-25%

Paid lower wage rates for the same work, Ban on festival processions
on roads, Denied home delivery of letters, Segregated seating in
schools, Denied entry into private health clinics, No access to grazing/
fishing grounds, Tailors refuse to take their measurements, Separate
drinking water in schools

15-20%

Discriminatory treatment in post offices, Cannot wear new/bright
clothes, No touching in transactions at shops, Denied access to public
roads/passage, Denied entry into primary health centers, Not allowed to
use umbrellas in public, Schools segregated so that Dalit students have
a non-Dalit teacher and Dalit teachers have non-Dalit students

10-15%

Denied entry into village council office, Ban on wearing dark glasses,
smoking, etc. No seating or must enter last on public transport,
Separate lines at polling booth, Denied entry into polling booth,
Cannot wear shoes/slippers on public roads, Discriminatory treatment
in primary health centers

Under 10%

Denied access/entry to public transport, Separate times at polling
booth, Discriminatory treatment in private clinics, Compulsion to seek
blessing in marriages, Forced to seek upper caste's permission for
marriages, Cannot use bicycles on public roads, Denied entry/seating in
cinema halls

Source: Shah et al. 2006.

phasized both empowering the masses and persecuting the upper classes,
as evident in the state's propaganda and policy efforts. Soon after coming to power in 1949, the CCP launched massive literacy campaigns (sao
wenmang), gender equalization laws (hunyin fa), and land redistribution
programs (tudi gaige) to promote its egalitarian goals. State investment
in public health and education was part of this egalitarian program.
Compared to the INC and India's other major political party, the BJP,
the CCP placed much higher prioritization on BHD in China's poor and
rural populations out of a professed commitment to a communist ideology of egalitarianism as well as to keep the poor loyal to the CCP and
capable of fighting a potential war of resistance against foreign invasion.
Following Confucian tradition, Chinese leaders took the role of ideology
very seriously. Whereas print media was relatively uncensored and per-
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mitted the exchange of different viewpoints within India, the CCP controlled the mass media in China and, during its first three decades in
power, used it to adamantly propagate a Marxist and Maoist ideology
(Schurmann 1968).
Motivated by an ideology glorifying the elimination of material and
status gaps between socio-economic classes, China experienced several
revolutionary changes that would mark a fundamental difference between its development trajectory and that of India in the early post-war
period. Land reforms (tudi gaige) and the Marriage Law of 1950 enabled
hundreds of millions of farmers and women across the country to escape
from landlordism and patriarchy. These reforms were significant in ensuring that rural Chinese could own their own land, grow their own food,
and choose their own marriage partners. Subsequently, general consolidation of state power in the early 1950s through rural penetration and
anti-corruption campaigns, like the "Three-Antis" (sanfan yundong)
against corruption, waste, and bureaucratic mentality, and the "Five-Antis" (wufan yundong) against bribery, tax evasion, fraud, theft of government property, and stealing of state economic secrets reduced corruption
(Lu 2000). It also concentrated power in the ruling party by eliminating
or taming potentially opposing forces including warlords, industrialists,
the landed bourgeoisie, and criminal organizations (Gong 1994).
These reforms also set the stage for major expansions of rural education and national health insurance over the next several decades during
the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution." On the one hand, these
campaigns contributed to major advances in the health, education, and
nutrition of children. On the other hand, these campaigns regularly involved harassment, torture, and brutal punishment of political dissidents
and opponents. By contrast, the Indian government did not attempt to
carry out major reforms in any of these areas.
The sharp divergence in political ideology between India and China in
the mid-twentieth century was clearly reflected in patterns of government
expenditure. In the early 1950s, Chinese public education expenditure
(PEE), at 2.0 percent of GDP, was three times higher than in India,
where it was only 0.6 percent of GDP. While spending increased in India,
by 1960 China still spent double the proportion of national income (3.0
percent) on public education as India (1.5 percent) (MoE 2006; Tilak
2006). China also invested heavily in public elementary and secondary
schools because its revolutionary ideology insisted that education was a
right and a duty for all citizens. This trend partially reversed itself during
the Cultural Revolution, a period of drastic cuts in Chinese higher education budgets. But even during the Cultural Revolution, China directed a
larger share of its education budget towards elementary education than
India (Pepper 1996; Tilak 2006). While this was a highly detrimental time
for China's urban schools and universities, there was a significant shift in
resources to expand primary education in the countryside where most of
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the population lived and where the unit cost of providing schooling was
significantly lower (Han 2000; Andreas 2009).
In the health sector, there was also a clear cut divergence with China
spending over twice as much on public health as a percentage of national
income than India in 1960 (1.3 percent versus 0.5 percent), and between
one and a half to two times as much as India in 1980 (3.0 percent versus
1.4 to 2.0 percent) (Bhalla 1992; Acharya et al. 2001). China's public
health budget also focused more on children and rural areas, whereas
most of Indian health spending was in the private sector and not directed
primarily towards the poor and rural majority of the population (WHO
1983).
Notably, in China, the dominant ideology promoted by the state shifted
after Mao's death. Ideological emphasis in the opening and reform (gaige
kaifang) period had gradually turned away from communism and towards
capitalism (1979-2003), until more recently, emphasizing the more ambiguous goal of developing a "socialist harmonious society" (shehuizhuyi
hexie shehui) since 2004 (Joshi 2012a). During this period, the CCP has
not only tolerated but also promoted increasing wealth and income inequality within China. Despite this major turnaround, its ideological slogans and public policies have nevertheless consistently emphasized
setting a basic minimum floor for children, particularly when it comes to
the implementation of maternal and child health programs and the expansion of compulsory education (Joshi 2012a). Ideologically, much
propaganda has been directed towards the promotion of improving the
"quality" (suzhi) of China's population by encouraging smaller families
with healthy, nourished, and well-educated children (Greenhalgh and
Winckler 2005). Since 1979, this has been coupled with a national population policy restricting most families to having only two children in rural
areas and one child in urban areas (ibid).
As shown in Table 5, much of the BHD gap between China and India
can be traced to the earlier 1950-1980 period when ideological differences
between the two countries were strongest. In 1950, the infant mortality
rate (IMR) of China (175) was higher than in India (146), but by 1979,
India's IMR (125) and child mortality rate (CMR) (153), were roughly
two and a half times higher than in China where, even by the highest
estimates, the IMR (56) and CMR (62) had dropped significantly (Nanda
and Ali 2006; Swamy 2003; World Bank 2012). Likewise, school expansion was much more rapid in China. Whereas in both countries roughly
one out of six people were literate in 1950, by 1980 two out of three Chinese were literate, compared to only about one out of three Indians.
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Table 5: Human Development Indicators in India and China
(1950-1979)

Human Development Indicators
Infant Mortality Rate
Literacy Rate
Primary School Enrollment
Secondary School Enrollment
Per Capita Income (2000 US$ PPP)

China1950

China1979

India1950

India1979

175

56

146

125

14

66

17

36

93

79

51

28

$762

$1179

Human Development Index Score
0.132
0.550
0.119
0.407
Data sources: Nanda and Ali 2006; Swamy 1989, 2003; World Bank 1981, 2012. Note:
the Human Development Index for 1950 was calculated by the author using data from
Swamy (2003) for per capita income in US dollars (purchasing power parity), adult
literacy rates, and life expectancy at birth, using the scaling norms of the 2005 UNDP
methodology: (Income: Log $100 to Log $40,000; Life Expectancy: "Rate" refers to
the share of the population that is literate; "Primary and secondary school enrollment
rates" refer to the percent of the age-specific population enrolled in school.
B.

THE IMPORTANCE OF STATE CAPACITY

Though a good portion of the gap between China and India can be
traced to ideological differences in the pre-1980 period, variation in state
capacity has also been a crucial factor in determining BHD achievements.
Joel Migdal (1988: 8) has defined "state capacity" as the state's ability to
penetrate society, regulate social relations, extract resources, and appropriate resources in a determined way. It can also be understood as the
state's "ability to perform appropriate tasks effectively, efficiently, and
sustainably" (Hildebrand and Grindle 1997: 34). State capacity is partly
constitutional and partly a matter of whether public administration functions in a "Weberian" manner (Evans and Rauch 1999). State capacity is
strong when the central government has enough power and efficiency to
implement policies (Wang and Hu 1998). Strong states, for example, are
able to conscript their populations to meet military or civil needs (Joshi
2011a). They are able to control their territories and prevent armed conflicts so that the government holds a legitimate monopoly over violence.
This usually requires high levels of tax compliance and the elimination of
untaxed and unregulated "informal sector" economic activities (Wang
and Hu 1998). It also requires skilled, trained civil servants and uncorrupt administrative management to effectively staff, promote, and supervise policy implementation and enforcement (Joshi 2011a). A state with
strong capacity maximizes the impact of allocated resources to achieve
programmatic goals, whereas corrupt, inefficient, and ineffective states
waste resources and are less capable of accomplishing stated goals.
Though India and China both have various capacity deficits, India has
generally been weaker than China in dimensions of state capacity relevant to fostering BHD. For instance, India has faced greater problems of
public personnel deficits. Doctor, teacher, and nurse absenteeism have
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been major problems in India (Chaudhury et al. 2006). A sizable portion
of public health and education expenditures are wasted when salaries are
paid to employees on Indian state government payrolls without services
being delivered (ibid). Studies conducted over the past decade have
found Indian health worker absenteeism rates to be the highest in the
world at about 40 percent (ibid; World Bank 2008). Teacher absenteeism
in India has also been high, averaging 25 percent across the country with
rates as high as over 40 percent in the state of Bihar (Rogers and Vegas
2009).
State capacity today differs between China and India, but the gap was
even wider in the past. Whereas federalism and administrative weakness
often undermined India's central government, the Chinese central government generally had more capacity to penetrate remote and rural areas. While this has enhanced China's ability to implement BHD policies,
it has also functioned as a double-edged sword. China has been more
effective than India in mobilizing its population for sanitation campaigns,
literacy drives, and rural development projects, but the Chinese government has also used this capacity to supervise, torture, and punish those
out of favor with the regime during intensely politicized campaigns like
the Anti-Rightist Campaign (fanyoupai) (1957), Four Cleanups Movement (siqingyundong) (1962-1965), and Cultural Revolution (1966-1976).
The strength of the Chinese state has stemmed in part from the personnel system of the CCP and its single-party control over the state. In the
early years after coming to power, the CCP controlled personnel in a
brute manner through constant, relentless, and dramatic anti-corruption
and rectification campaigns like the "Three-Antis" and "Five-Antis,"
aimed at reducing bribery, embezzlement, and other forms of malfeasance. While these campaigns could not wipe out all forms of public
abuse, they were successful in reducing corruption to the point that China
under Mao had less corruption than in the post-Mao period (Lu 2000;
Manion 2004).
In India, however, there was not even a single large-scale anti-corruption campaign launched after its independence. This left corruption almost completely unchecked (Vittal 2003). Where the CCP had stronger
organizational capacity to monitor administrative personnel, the INC
lacked such capacity. In India, the bureaucratic backbone, or "steel
frame," of the administration was the Indian Administrative Service
(IAS), a carry-over from the Indian Civil Service that served the British
during the colonial period. It was structured for the purpose of colonial
extraction and to efficiently maintain order with a small number of officials. Rather than reforming the civil service, India kept the IAS, which
many have seen as more of a "steal frame" for embezzling state resources
(Quah 2008). This practice was most notable under the rule of Indira
Gandhi, and has led to the corruption and politicization of the civil service into the twenty-first century (Godbole 2003).
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China has had its share of politicized government officials, and faced
problems of embezzlement, but the costs to officials of being in the CCP's
disfavor (i.e., imprisonment, struggle sessions, expulsion from the party,
execution, etc.) have meant that, compared to India, there have generally
been more substantial incentives for Chinese officials to comply with
their superiors. Another tool used by the CCP has been to require cadres
to demonstrate loyalty to the party's ideology. By contrast, the Indian
state has not engaged in comparable repertoires of detention and ideological motivation to control or deter corruption among civil servants.
Within India, known incompetent and corrupt officials have typically
been allowed to keep their posts in all sectors of public employment, including those impacting BHD. As one Indian school principal put it,
"[t]he teachers in the government schools are indifferent . . . . Once

teachers enter the school system they cannot be terminated. No one is
ever terminated." (Weiner 1991: 56) (emphasis added).
Turning to the state's ability to accrue financial resources, Chinese revenue collection was close to one-third of its national income during the
crucial 1950-1980 period, a very high level for a country with low percapita income. The accumulation of such financial resources enabled the
Chinese government to fund and carry out a much wider array of programs than if it had fewer resources available to it. As shown over fiveyear intervals in Table 6, state revenue in China was significantly higher
than in India for most of this period. Moreover, in India, the state could
only extract limited taxation from the rural areas, in part due to a constitutional prohibition against central government taxation of agriculture.
While this may have benefited some of the rural poor, it enabled large
absentee landowners to be free of tax obligations, thereby reducing the
public revenue available for public goods.
Table 6: Combined Revenue Collection in India and China as a
Percentage of GDP
Year
1950-1
1955-6
1960-1
1965-6
1970-1

India Revenue
8.6
10.4
12.3
16.5
16.0

China Revenue
NA
27.4
29.2
27.6
30.7

1975-6

20.0

27.2

1980-1

24.2

25.7

Average

15.4

28.0

Data source: Joshi 2007.

India's actual revenue-to-GDP ratios were probably somewhat lower
than these official figures due to the large size of the "informal" sector, or
uncounted portion of the economy, which still today encompasses over 90
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percent of the country's labor force. Tax reforms and improved revenue
collection in the late 1960s and 1970s did have positive payoffs for India
in the post-1980 period, but, from a comparative perspective, it is likely
that China's higher revenue raising capacity and taxation levels in the
initial years were an important force for laying down more extensive
physical and social infrastructures to help spread public health and education throughout the country.
Similarly, where the three-tiered Indian rural governance system of village councils (gram panchayat), block councils (taluka parishad), and district councils (zilla parishad) was weak and inactive in most places
between the 1960s and 1980s, the three-tiered Chinese system of communes (renmin gongshe), production brigades (shengchan dadui), and
production teams (shengchan dui) actively carried out basic administration and support for national campaigns (Unger 2002). The Chinese state
was also more capable of mobilizing manpower through mass conscription campaigns, including compulsory rural service for doctors and teachers through "sent-down" programs (xiaxiang). By contrast, various laws
for public service conscription of youth and professionals were never implemented in India (Jeffery 1987). The inability of the Indian state to
implement and enforce policies, both in the early years and later on, was
prominently reflected in Jawaharlal Nehru's own dislike of compulsion.
Whereas most countries claiming to be socialist laid down imperative and
compulsory conditions, Nehru "was unwilling even to use a measure of
compulsion" (Dutt 1981: 251).
Based on 2010 standardized governance measures produced by the
World Bank (2011), China (-0.77) and India (-1.31) continue to diverge
on political stability and the absence of violence. China (0.12) also scores
higher than India (-0.01) on government effectiveness (World Bank
2011). Although comparable data for China are not available, India has
been plagued for a long time by major problems of police, judiciary, and
administrative corruption (ibid). As shown in Table 7, in a major survey
conducted by Transparency International, over 85 percent of Indians view
the police as corrupt (CMS 2005). Similarly, over 75 percent view the
judiciary as corrupt. While India has been commended for its efforts toward enacting the rule of law, rampant judiciary corruption, deficits in
judicial appointments, court cases delayed for years, and people imprisoned for years awaiting trial reveal state capacity deficits in need of attention. For example, at the end of 2009, in Indian state high courts alone,
over four million cases were pending (SWI 2010).
The impact of administrative corruption, however, is probably the most
detrimental to BHD. As shown in Table 7, the public distribution system
(PDS), which provides food grains to the rural poor in India to combat
hunger and malnutrition, has failed in most states. Most designated
households do not receive grains in large part because they are stolen by
intermediaries. As displayed in Table 7, large scale corruption also
plagues Indian parliaments and state legislative assemblies and many
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members face criminal charges for murder, rape, and other serious
crimes.
Table 7: State Capacity Deficits in Major States of India (2005)

State

Residents who
Believe the
Police are

Residents who
Believe the
Judiciary is

Lok Sabha MPs
Charged with
Criminal Cases

Proportion of
Rural
Population
Receiving PDS
Food Grains

Corrupt (%)

Corrupt (%)

(%)

(%)

Andhra Pradesh

86

40

7

63

Bihar

96

94

33

4

Gujarat

88

81

27

42

Haryana

88

80

20

5

Karnataka

87

75

21

56

Kerala

70

48

42

80

Madhya Pradesh

94

88

24

11

Maharashtra

83

77

42

38

Orissa

85

80

14

5

Punjab

90

86

31

2

Rajasthan

91

85

16

16

Tamil Nadu

68

78

21

69

Uttar Pradesh

90

78

28

4

West Bengal

93

79

12

10

Data source: CMS 2005. Note: state acronyms are for Andhra Pradesh (AP), Bihar (BI),
Gujarat (GJ), Haryana (HR), Karnataka (KN), Kerala (KR), Madhya Pradesh (MP), Orissa
(OR), Punjab (PJ), Rajasthan (RJ), Tamil Nadu (TN), Uttar Pradesh (UP), and West
Bengal (WB). Dreze and Sen 2002; SWI 2006.

Over the last three decades, Indian state capacity has also been weaker
than China in preventing armed conflicts and urban massacres. Based on
its 2005 National Human Security Index score of 30 out of a possible 100,
India ranked seventh lowest in the world and slightly lower than China
(35 out of 100) (Joshi 2009). As shown in Table 8, among recorded incidents of mass urban violence claiming at least one hundred lives during
the post-1980 period, eight occurred in India and four in China. Though a
problem for both countries, with the notable exception of Tiananmen in
1989, urban massacres in China have been primarily limited to the border
provinces of Tibet and Xinjiang, whereas in India, mass killings have
taken place in the major metropolises of Ahmedabad, Delhi, Mumbai,
and Varanasi in addition to rural insurgencies and armed conflicts in disputed border areas. A border war with Vietnam resulting in 220 officially
recorded fatalities was China's only standing armed conflict in the post1980 period. By contrast, as detailed in Table 9, India had at least thirteen major armed conflicts resulting in an estimated 37,048 deaths between 1980 and 2010 (UCDP 2012). Comparably, the Indian state's
inability (or unwillingness) to guarantee the absence of violent conflict in
its territory has obstructed its ability to provide health care and education
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in conflict regions. Not only have these conflicts channeled general public spending away from HD and toward warfare, but lasting conflict has
been a deterrent to foreign and domestic investment in conflicted areas.
Table 8: Mass Violence (over 100 deaths) in Urban Centers of India
and China (1980-2010)
Year

Location/Incident

Country

Estimated Deaths

1984

Amritsar Massacre

India

Over 500

1984

Delhi Massacre

India

4,000 to 12,000

1989

Tiananmen Massacre (Multi-city)

China

1,000 to 4,000

1990

Srinagar Massacres

India

100

1992

Ayodhya/Bombay Riots

India

1,000 to 2,500

1993

Bombay Bombings

India

250

2001

Shijiazhuang Bombings

China

100

2002

Gujarat Genocide

India

1,000 to 2,000

2006

Mumbai Train Bombings

India

200

2008

Tibetan Protests/Crackdown

China

50 to 150

2008

Mumbai Attacks

India

150 to 200

2009

lirimqi Riots

China

200

Data Sources: Varshney 2002; Yagnik and Sheth 2005; Kaur and Crossette 2006; Shani 2007;
UCDP 2012. Alternative estimates may also be available on Wikipedia. Note: In the
aftermath of the Amritsar Massacre it is estimated that 20,000 to 30,000 Sikhs died during
conflict in the Indian state of Punjab between 1984 and 1992 (Shani 2007).

504

LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 18
Table 9: Armed Conflicts (Over 100 Deaths) in China and India
(1980-2010)

Country

Armed Conflict

Years

Estimated Deaths

China

China-Vietnam

1980-1988

220

India

Assam

1990-2010

1158

India

Bodoland

1989-2010

681

India

Bodo-Santhal

1996-1998

292

India

India-Pakistan

1984-2003

2119

India

Kuki-Naga

1993-1998

432

India

Kuki-Paite

1997

136

India

Maoist Insurgencies

1990-2010

4264

India

Kashmir

1989-2010

19006

India

Manipur

1982-2009

682

India

Nagaland

1992-2007

598

India

NSCN-IM - NSCN-K

2005-2010

260

India

Punjab/Khalistan

1983-1993

6899

India

Tripura

1980-2006

521

Data Source: UCDP 2012. Notes: Numbers of deaths are based on the cumulative
"best estimate" or only estimate of fatalities from UCDP. NSCN-IM stands for
National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isaac-Muivah faction. NSCN-K is the
National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang faction.

III.

COMPARING DEVELOPMENT OUTCOMES

Measuring BHD in terms of Human Development Index and MDG
criteria, China has made considerable strides over India, as shown in Table 10. In 2010, infant mortality was three times lower in China (1.6%)
than India (4.8%) while child mortality in China (1.8%) was about onefourth the rate of India (6.3%). Literacy in China (94%) was much
higher than in India (63%), and child malnutrition in India (44-48%) was
very high compared to China (5-12%). Overall the poverty rate in India
(69%), based on the two-dollar-per-day poverty threshold, was more than
double the level in China (30%). China was also ahead in primary education. In 2009, only 4 percent of Chinese children had not reached the
fifth grade of primary school compared to 30 percent in India (UNESCO
2012). Similarly, where child labor between ages five and fourteen was
less common in China outside Tibet and its Western provinces, it was still
common throughout India, estimated at about 28 percent (Jayaraj and
Subramanian 2005).
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Table 10: Comparing Basic Human Development in China and India
(2006-2010)
Human Development Indicators

Year

China

India

Infant Mortality

2010

1.6%

4.8%

Child Mortality

2010

1.8%

6.3%

Youth Illiteracy

2009

1%

19%

Adult Illiteracy

2009

6%

37%

Female Illiteracy

2009

9%

49%

Child Malnutrition (under-weight)

2006

5%

44%

Child Malnutrition (under-height)

2006

12%

48%

Poverty Rate (< $2/day)

2010

30%

69%

Data Source: World Bank 2012.

During the late 1990s, China also had twice the number of doctors per
capita and triple the number of hospital beds per capita as India, with two
out of every three child births in China taking place in hospitals, compared to only one in three in India (Dummer and Cook 2008). Although
there were significant regional disparities in both countries, about 90 percent or more of China's villages had functioning health care stations during this period with low rates of doctor and health worker absenteeism
compared to India (West 1997).
In conclusion, India has been slower than China at improving BHD.
Encouragingly, India's infant mortality rate dropped by more than half,
from 12.5 percent in 1980 to 4.8 percent in 2010, but Indian child malnutrition was still very high at 46 percent. When we tabulate the cumulative
impacts over time the results are staggering. Table 11 depicts the number
of child deaths under age five from 1970 to 2009, which was approximately 122 million in India compared to about 46 million in China. Thus,
while India was able to escape a famine like that which occurred in China
between 1958 and 1961 during its Great Leap Forward campaign, high
rates of everyday mortality in India have claimed a considerable number
of lives.
Table 11: Child Deaths in India and China (1970 to 2009)
Decade

India

China

1970-1979

38.61 Million

19.99 Million

1980-1989

34.17 Million

11.87 Million

1990-1999

28.16 Million

9.46 Million

2000-2009

20.73 Million

4.19 Million

Total

121.67 Million

45.51 Million

Data Source: Calculated from World Bank 2012 data.
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CONCLUSION

Today it is common to ask why India as a democracy has fallen behind
China on measures of BHD. The partial answer offered here is that,
among other factors, India has not yet succeeded in replacing the pervasive ideology of caste and social stratification with an ideology supportive
of equal opportunity and guaranteed basic human rights. India is a country that continues to struggle with massive social inequality and disempowerment, whereas China, a country with significant regional and
economic inequality, has neither a caste system nor the degree of gender
discrimination present in India. Moreover, in many sectors crucial to
BHD, corruption in India has been rampant, and state capacity is generally weaker than in China.
As shown in Figure 2, China has sustained economic growth rates after
1980 rapidly outpacing India. This is in part because of early investments
in women and children starting in the 1950s. Both countries' development strategies involved major tradeoffs. During the earlier period the
Chinese government demonstrated outright cruelty to the rich and "capitalist roaders" through sins of commission; while the Indian government
displayed pervasive cruelty to the poor through sins of omission. Over
the longer term, however, China's BHD foundations have resulted in a
labor force that is more skilled, literate, and mobile than India's. This is
especially true of young women, who are a major source of China's manufacturing labor force (Dobson 2009). Many women in India are, by contrast, uneducated or under-educated and face other significant workplace
obstacles, such as corrupt police who do not prevent rape and sexual harassment and social taboos prohibiting people of different caste origins
from living, working, and eating together.
Figure 2: Per Capita Income Growth in China and India (1980-2010)
8000
7000
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-
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-
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-
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-
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0-
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Data Source: World Bank 2012. Note: Per capita income refers to per capita GDP based
on purchasing power in constant 2005 US Dollars.
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In conclusion, the processes uncovered in this article challenge two
commonly held assumptions about improving BHD. First, it is often assumed that economic growth primarily drives BHD (Swamy 2005). But,
as demonstrated here, in the pre-1980 period, China experienced major
BHD progress while still experiencing a lower level of per-capita income
than India. Hence, although the relationship between economic growth
and BHD may be mutually causal, this comparison supports the findings
of several influential studies that BHD may contribute more to growth
than growth contributes to BHD (Ranis et al. 2000; Suri et al. 2011).
Another assumption is that democracies have higher BHD than nondemocracies (Przeworski et al. 2000; Haggard and Kaufmann 2008), but
empirical studies have found that this is not always the case (Joshi 2009).
A more nuanced understanding may show that the type of democracy is
also important in determining how much the state invests in BHD, particularly when it comes to women and children (Lijphart 1999; Heller 2000;
Persson and Tabellini 2003; Joshi 2009; Joshi 2012c; Joshi 2012d). Thus,
while economic growth and democratization may be valuable in their
own rights, analysis suggests that human and economic development in
both China and India would benefit from moving toward more inclusiveness in ideology and practice and developing a more effective system of
state administration to implement and enforce quality programs that benefit public health, education, and nutrition for all sections of the
population.
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